Post Single Page

On July 4, 2025, Qorvis Senior Advisor, retired Royal Navy officer, and writer for The Telegraph, Tom Sharpe, O.B.E., joins Roland Oliphant, Senior Foreign Correspondent for The Telegraph, on an episode of the British newspaper’s podcast, Battle Lines. The episode follows a stunning announcement from the United States Pentagon: a $47.3 billion plan to bolster the U.S. Navy with 19 brand-new battleships.

Drawing on his 27 years in the Royal Navy, during which he commanded four warships and rose to the rank of Commander, Sharpe is asked to weigh in on one central question: Trump wants a new armada, but can America still build one?

Sharpe not only offers valuable insight into this question but also explores the broader purposes of a nation’s navy, the strategic capabilities involved, and the procedural differences between the American and British fleets. With tales from his time at sea and sharp, straight-to-the-point analysis, Sharpe uses his decades of experience—both on and off the water—to assess the potential outcomes of the United States’ ambitious new plan and what it might mean for the future of naval power and warfare. 

Oliphant begins by asking Sharpe about the current state of the US Navy, compared to the Chinese PLA, seeing that in terms of “ruling the waves,” they are the competition.

Sharpe responds by affirming the enduring dominance of the US Navy, “This extra money could be the impetus to reverse what has been a fairly steady decline in terms of ship numbers and ship capabilities in the US Navy over the last 30 years…I may use the word decline, and it’s with slight caution, because it is still the world’s preeminent maritime fighting force, and it’s not even close. It’s off the scales, more comprehensive than anything else, including the Chinese. Chinese hull numbers now exceed US Navy hull numbers, but in tonnage, they do not. And tonnage is perhaps a better metric than hull numbers… when you put the whole US Navy together as a package, it is still an extraordinarily comprehensive way of protecting the maritime commons... So, if this is a reversal of that slight decline, that’s very good news.” 

Sharpe is urged further to answer: will or can the US even build these 19 new ships? What does this new money, and these 19 vessels, what do they look like? Sharpe cautions that America’s ability to translate funding into vessels remains uncertain.

“Well firstly, does it [the money], manifest in ships? … all these promises for extra cash that never quite makes it, they’re just promises… Ship building requires direct leadership. It requires the shipyards, and the contracts, and the commercials, to be committed to in a very ugly and early fashion or this money will not manifest in extra ships.” 

He outlines a key challenge: shipbuilding is not a practice that can be “switched back on” overnight.

“If these yards are going to start picking up the pace, then an awful lot of other things need to happen. And this is where the cynicism from my American colleagues starts creeping in. The general feeling is that the switch has been off for so long now, if this is turning it back on now, good. But no one quite knows what to do now to energize it into actual hulls that we can fight with.” 

Oliphant asks him to elaborate: what exactly has been switched off, and how can it be turned back on? Is this simply a question of the capabilities of building in America?

“Building ships is such a complex business… people tend to think often in terms of iPhones or cars. That is the wrong impression. These things are more like a space shuttle in terms of complexity. In fact, a nuclear submarine probably exceeds that… if you let these capabilities atrophy over time, gradually taper away, then the yards start losing the people that are required to build these ships… Let’s say the person who’s qualified to do the nuclear welds in the Virginia class submarine in the heart of the reactor, there’s probably only six people in America who are qualified do to that (Sharpe concedes that this point is slightly hyperbolic), the point being is, it doesn’t take too many of them to leave… before you can’t turn it back on… You can have all the money in the world, but when it comes to the complexity of ship building, and quickly, you’re going to run out of the right skills to do it.” 

This complexity urges Oliphant to ask: do your American colleagues feel that the Trump Administration grasps that side of the equation?

“No, in a word. He does. But how far down is that cascading” Sharpe provides a revealing quote from an American colleague: “there’s a lot of parlor games and backstabbing as usual. The Navy admirals don’t seem very motivated to help. It’s been so long since we moved the needle that nobody is left who knows that they’re doing… Enthusiasm from the top is real…There’s no real strategic plan. Lots of organizations and entities pushing, but not coordinating, it’s like having a ship with 11 captains on board.”

Sharpe ends this conversation by explaining that he does not believe the results of this plan will be seen during the time of the current administration. Trump has the power to put the right people in place, who can carry on the mission, but due to all of the difficulties mentioned before, there will be a lag.

As the conversation carries on, Oliphant asks a critical question: what, fundamentally, is the role of a navy in the modern world? What is the task that the American’s, specifically, are ordering these ships to do?

“It is as simple as this: everything in your home arrived by sea. Everything. Okay, 95%. It has to. And someone has to assure that stuff can reach your home in peace and in war. That is the navy’s job… The rest of the time it’s about imposing conditions, reinforcing international law, and ensuring freedom of navigation so that the things you need to make it to your country exist. Whether that’s oil, good, information, money, stuff in your house, without that, we die, right? It’s the UK in the second world war, if that [the flow of goods] gets strangled, your country dies. So, that is what navies are for.” 

“The US navy really hold the bat in that regard, policing and enforcing something resembling international law in the choke points of the world.”

Although Sharpe served in the Royal Navy, he spent much time in close coordination with the US Navy, and even working on American warships. Oliphant is curious to know what the differences between the Royal Navy vs. the US Navy are, from someone who has seen, intimately, the chains of command functioning for both.

As for the US Navy, he has this to say: “it’s an extraordinary institution. They’re very hierarchical. They’re very disciplined… If you’re going to operate successfully with them, there’s a set of rules that you need to understand. One of which does not involve bringing too many good ideas to the table.” 

On the other hand, “in the Royal Navy, we do a lot more of our discussions on voice circuits…You can have tactical conversations even with the admiral… Americans don’t encourage that. They run it from their carriers, or whichever ship is in charge… and you comply with those orders. Perhaps on occasions too rigid, but it works well for them, and it works well for allies plugging in to it, provided you understand the rules” 

Sharpe recounts an anecdote from 2004, that illustrates the unique strictness of the U.S. Navy’s command structure.

“Our job was to keep potential attacks off the oil platforms. This was a while back now in 2004, but we had to keep ships away from oil platforms. It was a US-led coalition. There were zones around the oil platforms. 3,000 Yards to 2,000 yards was a warning zone. Any ship goes inside that – you have to warn them. Now most of these guys are just fishing vessels trying to go home half the time… Inside 2,000 yards, you had to put a shot across the bow… And then inside 500 yards, weapons free, engage. We let a vessel get to 1,900 yards, it was clearly heading home…We could see into it, we knew it wasn’t a threat, but it wasn’t answering the radio. It got inside 2,000 yards and we didn’t put rounds in the water. Decided we didn’t need to. We got the signal that night from the American admiral. I will never forget the use of his language, probably isn’t repeatable on this podcast and certainly not something you’d expect to see in print. He basically said it’s unacceptable, this is about imposition of real estate, not Royal Navy bull**** threat assessment. And then a couple of hours later, we get sent another signal essentially dispatching us 200 miles south. We’d been sent to the naughty step. We’d been sent away to go and have a long hard think about what our role in life is and then come back when you think you’re ready. So, that’s what I mean by the rules of the game.” 

With risks of American abandonment, Oliphant asks, can allied navies operate successfully without U.S. support?

Sharpe offers a sobering assessment:  

“It is very hard to overstate how thin we become in the maritime domain without US support… you can start convincing yourself that we can do this [alone]. That is absolutely not the case.” 

However, he emphasizes that, despite political rhetoric, military cooperation between the U.S. and its allies remains strong.

… American warships were coming out of the woodwork to support us [in the Red Sea]…The special relationship is in place, and it’s not a political thing…it is high-level military-to-military engagement and quite often technology sharing as well… The trust between our navies is absolutely in place.”  

Oliphant then asks, once more, despite fears of U.S. retreat, will the US continue to protect global sea lanes of keeping sea lanes open globally?

Sharpe answers, “I think the answer to that is yes. It’s in their DNA. It really is in their Navy’s DNA, in their military DNA.” 

Bringing the episode to a close with perhaps the most important question, Oliphant asks Sharpe, if during his times on the sea, did he ever think to himself, “bloody hell, I am Jack Aubrey?” (Swashbuckling fictional captain from the Napoleonic Wars). 

Sharpe laughs and answers, “Yes.” 

“… and then you quietly and quickly as possible put that thought to one side and get on with running the ship.” 

Listen to the entire episode to hear more exciting anecdotes, specific case studies, and valuable insights.  

Telegraph
Spotify
Apple Music