Post Single Page

In the past two weeks, Iran and Israel exchanged missiles during a short but intense war, culminating in U.S. involvement, including the deployment of “bunker buster” bombs on Iranian nuclear sites. Following a brief retaliation from Iran targeting a U.S. military base in Qatar, a principally U.S.-brokered ceasefire has been reached and held by both sides.

Although the ceasefire is currently in place, maritime security risks remain high in the Strait of Hormuz, the Arabian Gulf, and the Red Sea. These trade routes have experienced significant AIS spoofing, GPS jamming, and rerouting disruptions.

On June 29, 2025, retired Royal Navy Officer and current communications consultant and writer at The Telegraph, Tom Sharpe, O.B.E., joined industry experts Ami Daniel, Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Siddarth Mahajan, and Peter Aylott for a live security briefing with Windward. The panel discussed operational risk and the evolving threat landscape for governments and global shipping.

When asked about his thoughts on Iran’s presence in, and tactics regarding, the Strait of Hormuz, Sharpe responded:

“They are on their best behavior… The Iranian situational awareness in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Gulf, is very good. Of course, it’s their home… beneath the boarding and harassment, you’ve got their fast attack craft and fast inshore attack craft… and then they’ve got the ballistic missiles… and then you start getting into their midget submarines, their Yonos, their Ghadirs, and these are owned by the IRGCN to a large extent, and they carry heavyweight torpedoes. They sit in the Straight, and they hover into tide with a little impeller and their job is to wait for the big juicy target to come past and unload a heavyweight torpedo undetected. And then, of course, the final one which grabs more attention is the mining threat. Again, they have thousands of these, thousands of mines, hundreds of mine laying vessels, which are normally just converted fishing boats with barrels on the back. These barrels open up and the mines fall out, and you’ve got your mine threat. That’s relevant because, of course, they don’t actually need to even do it; they can just say they’ve done it. So, we have this great long list of things which they could use to disrupt the straight... I think geopolitically closure is very unlikely, they could do it with all that I’ve just outlined, they really could, but we’ve always had the assumption that they wouldn’t do it unless the regime had nothing else to lose, because it cripples them, it cripples China… they are, for me, unnervingly quiet and I think that’s probably because someone’s told them to be.”

Sharpe emphasizes that Iran holds a strong “home-court advantage” in the Strait of Hormuz and could disrupt or shut it down if they chose to. However, he also notes that a full closure is unlikely, as it would be incredibly damaging for the regime and its allies, like China. If it were to happen, though, the impact would be immediate, severe, and difficult to control.

Sharpe was also asked about the role of the UK and U.S. navies in the region and whether their responsibilities include ensuring trade access through the Gulf. He responded:

“Yeah, that’s the core, but 30 years of peace dividend has essentially eroded that ability in most navies to almost zero. When you look back at the 80s and the escorting effort that went on getting ships in and out of the Gulf, we couldn’t get anywhere near that now. Of course, the US Navy has two carriers sitting in the Gulf of Oman at the moment, they’ve got a third heading across the Mediterranean across the Atlantic, now heading the USS Ford. So, they’ve got the carriers, and they’ve got the ships, but the minute you start getting into escorting, you’re now tying up lots of hulls, and lots of people, and lots of money, and you’re putting yourself in harm’s way. If you start parading yourself past all the threats that I outlined earlier, you’re increasing that risk of miscalculation or the rogue IRGCN commander trying to make a name for himself and now suddenly you’re in the very fight that you’ve been trying to avoid.” 

Asked again whether Iran truly has the capacity to shut down the Strait, Sharpe replied:

 “They absolutely could… they’ve done nothing but prepare for this.” 

In his concluding remarks, Sharpe warns of the persistent danger of miscalculation:

“The one constant through all of these variables of unpredictability and violence is the threat of miscalculation. That has not gone away…. We don’t know where the Supreme Leader is on this; we know he has direct links to the IRGCN, but what is he saying? And what is the ambitious young commander who wants to make a name for himself thinking and doing? That’s been a risk throughout, and it remains… they have rapidly promoted people who have taken bold decisions in the past, so miscalculation for me is the constant here. If they were to reopen this, then I would expect it to start via the Houthis in the Red Sea because it creates an enormous force flow problem immediately. You have to split the carriers. So, if it happens deliberately, it’ll be in the Red Sea, but for me, the real risk is it [conflict] sparking off again by accident.” 

Watch the entire briefing here.